India’s ASW readiness

China has stepped up its activity in the Indian Ocean while maintaining a sizeable numbers advantage to India’s submarines. Can India adapt its surface technologies to thwart sub-surface threats?

Background

Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) employs surface vessels, aircraft or other submarines to find, track and deter sub-surface enemy targets.  Second strike capability is the foundational principle upon which nuclear deterrence is established. The ability to counter nuclear first-strike assets on land has resulted in water-based, second-strike platforms - typically, submarines. The ability to effectively perform ASW is vital in reducing the second-strike capabilities of any power. Additionally, ASW facilities the ability of a power to thwart conventional submarine capabilities, including reconnaissance activity. 

The Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) is an accord between India and the US, geared towards enabling greater communications and military interoperability. Interoperability is the ability of a system to work with other platforms without any restrictions. COMCASA facilitates the transfer of specialised equipment from the US to India, in addition to representing America’s Indo-Pacific shift.

The Indo-Pacific comprises the Indian Ocean, as well as western and central parts of the Pacific Ocean. America’s pivot to Asia aims to increase US influence in the Indo-Pacific region. It presents America as an Asian power against China’s expanding geopolitical power.

Analysis

India currently operates 16 submarines, of which one is nuclear-powered (another is currently undergoing trials). Nuclear power allows submarines to operate indefinitely, restricted only by supply issues for its crew. Conversely, China wields 78 submarines, of which 23 are nuclear-powered. China’s dependence on the South China Sea and the Middle East for its crude-oil imports requires the nation to project its power on vast stretches of the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.

India has historically used its surface capabilities to counter sub-surface threats. For example, in 1971, the Indian Navy sank Pakistan’s first fast-attack submarine, PNS Ghazi, using ASW. To satisfy the disparity presented by China’s submarine power, Indian authorities have focused on building up its anti-submarine assets. India developed an indigenously built class of corvettes called Kamorta that serves as its primary surface asset against submarines. India’s three Karmota-class corvettes (another is currently under construction) are fitted with internal platforms, including radar and sonar technology, tailored explicitly for ASW. To effectively find and track submarines, India also operates eight (four more on the way) Boeing P-8I Poseidon, transferred to India under COMCASA. The Indian Navy operates Sikorsky’s SH-3 Sea King and Westland’s WS-61 Sea King, designed to ‘hunt’ and ‘kill’ submarines. To continue to augment India’s ASW capabilities, India is set to purchase 24 MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, replenishing the ageing British-made Westland Sea King, from the US under COMCASA.

A US-led initiative that works to assess China’s growing clout in Asia is primarily in coalition with India, Japan and Australia. Called the Quad, this initiative effectively covers the entirety of China’s sea-faring territory: Japan to it’s east, Australia to the South-East and India to the West, with the US able to project its power across the region.

In recent weeks, India has conducted multiple drills and exercises, specifically focused on ASW, with Japan, Australia and the US. Japan has, in recent years, brought multiple platforms it uses to engage in ASW to boost interoperability between the two military forces. The US brought its P8 aircraft and a guided-missile destroyer to a joint submarine-hunting exercise. Australia brought its P8 aircraft, ASW frigates and refuelling vessels to AUSINDEX 2019. The parties believe that each partner must operate at similar standards while ensuring that the mammoth task is divided in an operationally effective manner. Interoperability exercises aid in boosting India’s defensive posture, while allowing higher-levels of parity with the Chinese threat. 

Counterpoint

India has historically promoted a policy of non-alignment. It’s current ASW efforts require inputs from multiple external sources to counter the Chinese sub-surface threat effectively. India is, therefore, giving up its strategic autonomy. At the beginning of 2019, India conspicuously rejected Australia’s involvement in the annual Malabar naval exercise, while Japan and the US participated. This is indicative of concerns within Indian defence circles of overtly leaning on load-sharing to thwart Chinese sub-surface action. India is drawing a clear distinction between the Quad and the broader Indo-Pacific strategy. 

Assessment

Our assessment is that India is using its COMCASA agreement with the US to catch-up with China’s runaway submarine power. However, India is hesitant to fully commit to the American-led Quad strategy due to the importance it places on strategic autonomy. We believe that India will continue to augment its ASW capabilities through interoperability missions with its strategic partners, although it will stop shy of multilateral exercises. Simultaneously, it will also develop other indigenous technologies, such as submarine drones, to meet its requirement for strategic autonomy. 

Image Courtesy: Indian Navy [GODL-India (https://data.gov.in/sites/default/files/Gazette_Notification_OGDL.pdf)]

Read more: